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ABSTRACT Most social scientists once took a negative view of the socio-economic consequences of the Green
Revolution. Events have since proved them wrong. Using Bangladesh as an example, we oﬀer three reasons why
social scientists were mistaken. One is the focus on village studies at the expense of nationally representative
surveys. Another is insuﬃcient appreciation of the technical limits of the new rice technology. The third is a
misleading model of agrarian change. The inability of village studies to validate generalisations, the reluctance
to abandon the historical model of de-peasantisation, and opposing beliefs about how to evaluate socio-
economic consequences created a Rashomon Eﬀect that made the controversy hard to resolve.
Convictions are greater enemies of truth than lies. (Nietzsche)
Debate over the Green Revolution – the spread of high-yielding varieties of rice and wheat –
once dominated writing on rural development. At the centre of this debate were the economic
and social consequences of new varieties of rice in south Asia. Initial optimism about ‘miracle
seeds’ was short-lived (Brown, 1970). For the next 20 years, most social science writing about the
consequences of the Green Revolution was critical (Farmer, 1977; Griﬃn, 1979; Pearse, 1980).
Defenders of the Green Revolution came chieﬂy from the International Rice Research Institute
(IRRI) that developed the new varieties (IRRI, 1975).1 Only in the late 1980s did some critics
have second thoughts. Return visits showed that earlier fears were largely unjustiﬁed (Hazell and
Ramaswamy, 1991). With the recantation by a prominent critic (Lipton with Longhurst, 1989),
mainstream social science ﬁnally took a positive view of the Green Revolution.
Summarised, the critics’ arguments went as follows.2 True, there was nothing in the new seeds
themselves that favoured big farmers. But to produce higher yields, they needed expensive inputs
like fertiliser and irrigation. Big farmers could aﬀord these inputs, but small farmers needed
credit. Attempts to provide small farmers with credit through cooperative societies failed,
however, because these were captured by big farmers. Hence, small farmers were denied access to
the new rice technology. Sharecroppers, who shared half the yield with their landlord yet paid the
full cost of inputs, had even less incentive to adopt the new seeds. As a result, the main users of
the new technology were big farmers. To maximise proﬁts from the new rice technology, big
farmers evicted their sharecroppers and started to farm for themselves with hired labour.
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Sharecroppers became full time labourers. The new rice technology required more labour than
before. To reduce labour costs, big farmers invested in machinery but this also reduced
employment among the poor. Finally, big farmers expanded their farms at the expense of smaller
farmers, who gradually became landless. Thus, the rich got richer and the poor got poorer. Given
an unequal distribution of land and income, how could it be otherwise? Expecting the Green
Revolution to beneﬁt small farmers and the landless was like expecting water to run uphill.
In Bangladesh most of these predictions have turned out to be false. By 2000, new varieties
covered 64 per cent of the area planted to rice. Yet small farmers had adopted the new rice
varieties and even planted them on a greater share of their land. Sharecroppers had adopted as
readily as owner-operators. Far from evicting their tenants, big farmers had increased the area
they rented to them. Mechanised land preparation was now widespread, which reduced
employment, but power tillers were also used by small farmers. Likewise, there had been no
increase in big farms. Over time, both the number and average size of big farms had shrunk.
True, both land and income were distributed more unequally than before. But there was no
increase in poverty. Indeed, the share of people living in poverty had fallen. Water was running
uphill.3
The aim of this article is not to explain why these predictions were wrong, but to explain why
social scientists made them.4 Although we discuss research results, the primary focus is on
research questions and the research process. Others have addressed these topics, but in general
terms (Chambers, 1984; Farmer, 1986). The current furore over transgenic crops has sparked
interest in the lessons of the Green Revolution (Ruttan, 2004). What can we learn from past
experience that is still relevant today?
Speciﬁcally, we ask three questions:
1. What methods did social scientists use and how appropriate were these methods?
2. How well did social scientists understand the new technology itself?
3. What were the models that social scientists used and why?
Bangladesh has several merits as a case study. As a modern-day Malthusia, it epitomised the
challenge that the Green Revolution was designed to meet (Robinson, 1974). Bangladesh also
had a high proportion of small farmers, sharecroppers, and landless households. The struggle
to reconcile production and equity objectives made the debate over the Green Revolution
particularly intense. This is not to claim that Bangladesh was typical. Elsewhere, the trajectory of
the Green Revolution and the accompanying debate may have been diﬀerent. The article oﬀers
a critique of the debate in Bangladesh, rather than of social science writing on the Green
Revolution as a whole. Reference is made to the wider literature where this sheds light on the
debate in Bangladesh.
The literature on the Green Revolution in Bangladesh is voluminous. Our analysis relies
principally on 14 studies selected for their relevance, inﬂuence, and accessibility (Table 1).
Other studies were used to provide additional evidence. The studies cover a 29-year period
between 1973 and 2001. The publication of Green Revolution (Hossain, 1989) eﬀectively ended
the debate.
I. Mistaken Methods?
One reason why social scientists got it wrong may have lain in their choice of methods. What
were these methods and how eﬀective were they?
Table 1 shows that 10 of our 14 sample sources consisted of village studies.5 The global
literature on the Green Revolution coincided with a golden age for village studies (Figure 1). By
1988, no fewer than 127 ‘mainstream’ village studies had been made in Bangladesh, more than
half of them in the 1970s (Adnan, 1990). The approach used by village studies varied according
to research objective. Studies of technology adoption compared adopters and non-adopters in
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one or two villages (Asaduzzaman, 1979; Alam, 1984) or changes in adoption over time in the
same village (Ahmed, 1981; Jones, 1984; Alauddin and Tisdell, 1991). Most village studies of the
socio-economic consequences of the Green Revolution used the method of treatment and control
(van Schendel, 1981a; Rahman, 1986; Glaser, 1989). This was also the method used by Green
Revolution (Hossain, 1989) which compared villages with and without irrigation.
How eﬀective were village studies in uncovering the consequences of the Green Revolution? Table
2 compares bivariate rates of technology adoption between village studies and sample surveys. Four
village studies in our sample compared adoption rates of the new rice varieties between big and small
farmers for a total of eight villages.6 In ﬁve villages, adoption rates were higher for big farmers by a
wide margin. By contrast, surveys showed no diﬀerence in adoption rates between big and small
farmers (Hossain, 1989). Village studies were made in the early years of the Green Revolution,
however, and small farmers adopted more slowly because they were more averse to risk. Lags in
adoption left room for conﬂicting views about whether small farmers were adopting the new rice
technology.7 Village studies also showed that, in ﬁve villages, adoption rates for tenants were higher
than for owners, and that access to irrigation was similar for both big and small farmers. These
ﬁndings were all conﬁrmed by studies at the macro-level (Hossain, 1989; Hossain et al., 1994). In
fact, the ﬁnding that small farmers had equal access to irrigation was conﬁrmed by the Agricultural
Census in 1977 (GoB, 1981), long before evidence became available from sample surveys.
Village studies had a bias towards speciﬁc regions. Of the 127 ‘mainstream’ village studies,
65 per cent were made in just ﬁve of Bangladesh’s 19 districts (Adnan, 1990).8 Eight of the
10 village studies in our sample were made in these ﬁve districts (Table 1). Studies of the Green
Revolution required districts with high rates of irrigation (Howes, 1985a; Glaser, 1989), while
the need to understand changes over time forced researchers back to where the technology was
ﬁrst introduced (Lewis, 1991). Another weakness was variability between villages. One study
identiﬁed land mortgage (bondhok) as the mechanism of polarisation by which land was
transferred from small to big farmers (Wood, 1978). But in other villages land was mortgaged for
Figure 1. Village studies, the Green Revolution, and poverty in Bangladesh, 1960–1990. Sources: Right-
hand axis: Village studies: Adnan (1990) (year of ﬁeldwork); Global literature on Green Revolution:
Commonwealth Agricultural Bureau International database, journal articles with ‘Green Revolution’ in
title (year of publication). Left-hand axis: real wages for agricultural labourers: Palmer-Jones (1993).
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a ﬁxed number of years (a system known as khai khalashi) and did not result in the permanent
transfer of land (Arens and van Beurden, 1977; Glaser, 1989). With over 65,000 villages in
Bangladesh, how was one to know what was typical?
A Quiet Violence (Hartmann and Boyce, 1988) illustrates the perils of generalisation. The
biggest landlord in the village used a new Deep Tubewell (DTW) to increase yields, raise rents,
and buy land from small farmers. ‘In thousands of villages throughout north-western
Bangladesh’, the authors warned, ‘the World Bank’s aid has similarly strengthened the hand
of the rural rich’ (Hartmann and Boyce, 1988: 258). But a survey ﬁve years later in the same
region found no bias towards big farmers in access to DTW irrigation and no adverse eﬀects
on sharecroppers (BIDS, 1983).9 The exception was the district where A Quiet Violence was
located. A Quiet Violence swiftly became one of the best-known accounts of village life in
Bangladesh. The BIDS report was never published and lies quietly gathering dust on a library
shelf.
Ultimately, village studies were replaced by national surveys. Green Revolution (Hossain, 1989)
sampled 16 villages drawn from eight districts, representing the principal agro-ecological zones.
In Modern Rice Technology (David and Otsuka, 1994), the evidence from Bangladesh was based
on a random sample of 62 villages, selected from 62 of the 64 districts in the country, and with
a random sample of 1245 households. The same households and their descendants were
re-surveyed in 2000 to create a national panel survey (Hossain et al., 2007). For the ﬁrst time,
generalisations about the socio-economic consequences of the Green Revolution were based on
a nationally-representative sample.
II. Misunderstood Technology?
The Green Revolution in Bangladesh was a slow and uneven process. Bangladesh achieved self
suﬃciency in rice only in 2000, more than 30 years after the introduction of the ﬁrst modern rice
varieties (MVs) (Deb, 2002). Only one-ﬁfth of the increase in production came from rainfed
rice (Hossain, 2009). Most came from irrigated rice, despite its smaller area. How well did social
scientists understand the reasons for this diﬀerence?
Social scientists recognised that the ﬁrst MVs were not well-adapted to rainfed rice
environments (Brown, 1970) and the need to develop varieties suitable for Bangladesh where
the main rice crop was grown in the wet season (Farmer, 1979).10 Fifty per cent of the Aman
crop was grown where water depth was below 30 cm (shallow rainfed), and 40 per cent above
30 cm (deepwater) (Huke, 1988). These two rice environments required varieties that were both
tall (to avoid submergence) and sensitive to photoperiod (to ﬂower before winter temperatures
reduced yields). The ﬁrst MVs met neither of these requirements. Some social scientists were
optimistic that rice breeders could develop MVs suitable for rainfed environments (Farmer,
1979), while others thought that the only solution was to expand the area under irrigation
(Falcon, 1970). Still others took this pessimism a stage further. They believed that slow progress
in developing MVs for rainfed environments was no accident but the result of a deliberate
research strategy (Anderson et al., 1991).
Summarised, their arguments went as follows. Before 1960, rice research in Bangladesh
reﬂected regional diversity. This strategy, based around regional research stations, resulted in
varieties adapted to ﬁt diﬀerent rice environments. IRRI, by contrast, was based in a single
institute and followed a ‘universal’ strategy to breed varieties with wide adaptation, though in
practice these varieties were best grown with irrigation. After Partition in 1947, rice research in
Bangladesh experienced a steep decline. Into this vacuum stepped IRRI, imposing a centralised
structure and its universal research strategy, backed by a government eager to make Bangladesh
self-suﬃcient in rice in the shortest possible time. Rice research in Bangladesh changed its
strategy to focus on irrigated rice. Only in the 1980s when IRRI recognised the limitations of
a universal strategy did Bangladesh ﬁnally return to its earlier research strategy of breeding for
speciﬁc rice environments.
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How accurate was this assessment? There is strong evidence that Bangladesh did adopt IRRI’s
centralised model of rice research. But there is equally strong evidence that Bangladesh did not
abandon breeding for rainfed rice.
Breeders at the Bangladesh Rice Research Institute (BRRI) still believed in their original
strategy. Over the period 1970–1990, they expected only 23 per cent of the increase in production
to come from irrigated rice, but 41 per cent from the shallow rainfed environment, and 22 per
cent from the deepwater environment (Barker and Herdt, 1979). The results from BRRI’s
breeding programme reﬂect this strategy (Table 3). True, 18 (56%) of the varieties released
between 1970 and 2000 were for irrigated Boro rice. But a closer look reveals signiﬁcant
diﬀerences. Of the 18 Boro varieties, only 10 were BR advanced lines, meaning that they came
from crosses made by BRRI (p4 0.006). Fourteen of these Boro varieties had IR parents,
meaning that they incorporated germplasm from crosses made by IRRI (p4 0.007). Thus, most
Boro varieties were advanced lines imported, tested, and released without the need for any
breeding by BRRI. By contrast, of the 15 varieties released for T. Aman, 14 were BR advanced
lines or crosses made by BRRI. Nine T. Aman varieties had one or more BR parents, which
meant they incorporated germplasm from previous BR crosses (p4 0.013) Thus, the breeding
programme for rainfed rice took a greater share of BRRI’s research resources. BRRI also
promoted rainfed rice by hosting international conferences on deepwater rice in 1974 and
photoperiod-sensitive rice in 1977 (BRRI, 1980; Farmer, 1979). A new Cropping Systems
Research Division was established in 1974. Four of its six research sites were for rainfed rice. The
budget for the Cropping Systems Division was soon second only to that for Plant Breeding
(IRRI, 1984). Social scientists can justly claim credit for inﬂuencing IRRI’s rice breeding
objectives in favour of rainfed rice environments (Lipton with Longhurst, 1989: 344–345). But
this was not the case in Bangladesh, which already had a long history of breeding for these
environments.
Table 3. Bangladesh Rice Research Institute varieties, by decade and season, 1970-2000.
Year of varietal release
1970s 1980s 1990s Total pa
Rice season
Aus 0 2 3 5
T. Aman 2 4 9 15
Boro 7 7 4 18
Total 8 13 16 38
BR advanced lines
Aus 0 2 2 4 0.006
T. Aman 2 4 8 14
Boro 4 3 3 10
Total 5 9 13 25
Varieties with one or more IR parents
Aus 0 1 2 3 0.007
T. Aman 1 1 2 4
Boro 6 7 1 14
Total 6 9 5 21
Varieties with one or more BR parents
Aus 0 0 0 0 0.013
T. Aman 1 2 6 9
Boro 1 2 1 4
Total 2 4 7 13
Notes: a¼Probability of a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between two groups by Fisher’s exact test (AusþBoro
versus T. Aman). Values reported are for 2-tail test.
Sources: Varieties: Hossain et al. (2006). BR advanced lines and parentage: Das (2005).
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How eﬀective was this strategy? In three decades of breeding, BRRI failed to release a single
variety of deepwater rice (Islam, 2004). Yields from deepwater MVs had to exceed 3 tonnes per
hectare because yields from local varieties were higher than previously thought (Catling, 1992).
The requirement of photoperiod sensitivity limited breeding trials to one season per year. The
condition by the National Variety Release Committee that new varieties out-yield local varieties
for three consecutive seasons was hard to achieve in a ﬂood-prone environment. Breeding for
T. Aman was more successful. Generally, it takes 10 years to develop a new rice variety, so the
results of the breeding programme were not visible until 1980, with the release of BR11. Thanks
to BR11 production of rainfed rice in the 1980s grew faster than that of irrigated rice (Jabbar and
Palmer-Jones, 1997). In sum, the evidence does not suggest that BRRI meekly submitted to a
universal rice research strategy that neglected rainfed rice environments. However, its breeders
underestimated the technical problems involved. Twenty years after its release, BR11 was still the
most widely grown MV in the wet season, covering 42 per cent of the area planted to T. Aman
rice (Hossain et al., 2006). This testiﬁes to the skill of BRRI’s rice breeders but also highlights the
challenge of developing new MVs for this rice environment.
Social scientists were slow to grasp the implications for technology adoption. Only four of the
10 village studies in our sample were made in rainfed environments (Table 1). However, a
nationwide survey in 1987 concluded that ‘technical and environmental factors are more
important in determining the adoption of modern varieties than socio-economic factors’
(Hossain et al., 1994: 232). Depth of ﬂooding, rainfall, and salinity were more important
determinants of adoption in the wet season than farm size, land tenure, or access to credit.
III. Misleading Models?
Fernand Braudel once compared models to ships: built on land, launched in water. What models
did social scientists use? How well did they survive contact with the muddy water of the Bengal
delta? Why were these models chosen?
Defenders of the Green Revolution accused its critics of using misleading models:
Students who viewed development through the spectacles of British agricultural history,
particularly the lessons that Marxian analysis drew from that history, viewed the new seed-
fertiliser technology as a contemporary manifestation of enclosure and clearances. They
failed to understand the distinction between biological technology, which is neutral with
respect to scale, and the scale economies associated with introduction of mechanical
technology. (Ruttan, 1993: 271)
As we shall see, the critics of the Green Revolution were inﬂuenced by historical models. In
Bangladesh, the critics adopted Lenin’s model, seeing the Green Revolution as accelerating the
process by which rich peasants became capitalist farmers. Widely accepted by non-Marxists, this
remained the dominant view of the Green Revolution in Bangladesh until the end of the 1980s.
The critics focused on the distribution of beneﬁts from irrigated rice. Irrigation required
mechanical pumps, which obviously did have economies of scale. Small farmers had access to
irrigation through membership of cooperatives. However, the critics argued that cooperatives
were ‘closed clubs of kulaks’ controlled by big farmers. Privatisation of irrigation in the 1980s
transformed big farmers into ‘water lords’ who charged monopoly prices. Big farmers also
beneﬁted from subsidies on irrigation and fertiliser. Hence, the beneﬁts from irrigated rice went
‘almost exclusively’ to big farmers (de Vylder, 1982: 151). This encouraged the growth of a stable
class of rich peasants who evicted sharecroppers so they could cultivate directly with hired labour
and who re-invested their proﬁts in buying up land from small farmers. In consequence, the
Green Revolution accelerated polarisation and increased poverty.11
Did the beneﬁts from irrigated rice go primarily to big farmers? Table 4 assembles case-study
evidence on the distribution of income from irrigation by DTWs, a high-cost technology that
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critics believed favoured big farmers (Howes, 1985b).The studies cover both major regions
irrigated by DTWs. Three studies are for a single crop year, but one study collected data for ﬁve
consecutive years and compared DTWs dominated by large and small farmers (Chisholm, 1984).
Table 4 shows that the share of land irrigated by small farmers was similar to or greater than
their share of the total area operated. Hence, small farmers had equal access to irrigation from
DTWs. However, Table 4 also shows that, in three cases, the largest share of income from DTW
irrigation – 30 per cent or more – did indeed go to big farmers, who accounted for only a small
fraction of irrigator households. Yet about 25 per cent (in two cases 50%) of income went to
small farmers. This was true even in the north-west, where landholding was dominated by big
farmers. Similarly, hired labour received about 15 per cent. Only pure tenants beneﬁted little.
Further evidence on the distribution of beneﬁts came from the 1981–1983 sample survey. With
irrigation, agricultural income for big farmers rose by 34 per cent while that for small farmers
rose by 22 per cent (Hossain, 1989). Did irrigation increase income inequality? Results from the
same survey found that irrigation reduced inequality, but that inequality increased overall
because of inequality in the distribution of non-agricultural income (Hossain, 1989). The sample
survey in 1987–1988 also found that irrigation reduced inequality but no evidence that income
inequality increased overall (Hossain et al., 1994).
Did big farmers use the proﬁts from irrigated rice to buy land from poorer farmers? If true,
then in villages with new rice technology we would expect to ﬁnd that: (1) downward mobility
through loss of land was higher among small and marginal land owners; (2) upward mobility
through purchase of land was higher for medium than for marginal and small landowners; and
(3) stability was higher among big landowners.
Table 4. Distribution of beneﬁts from Deep Tubewell (DTW) irrigation in Bangladesh (%)
Source
Howes
(1985a)
Chisholm (1984)
BIDS
(1983)
Mott-MacDonald
(1990)
‘Big-farmer
dominated’
‘Small-farmer
dominated’
Year of ﬁeldwork 1978–1979 1978–1982 1978–1982 1980–1981 1988–1989
Region North-East North-West North-West North-West North-East
Sample DTWs (no.) 2 2 2 24 10
Area operated
Big farmers 28 54 10 56 13
Medium farmers 30 28 53 22 37
Small farmers 38 18 37 20 50
Pure tenants 5 0 0 2 Na.
Area irrigated
Big farmers 28 23 3 18 12
Medium farmers 31 23 34 45 31
Small farmers 37 39 52 27 58
Pure tenants 5 15 11 10 Na.
Irrigator households
Big farmers 13 6 2 7 1
Medium farmers 17 16 33 15 17
Small farmers 58 68 49 63 79
Pure tenants 12 10 16 15
Income
Big farmers 30 30 3 33 18
Medium farmers 22 19 28 22 16
Small farmers 27 28 50 26 50
Pure tenants 3 4 5 2 0
Hired labour 19 19 14 17 16
Note: Details of the methods used to derive these ﬁgures are available from the author.
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Table 5 tests these three hypotheses using evidence from six village studies. Three compare
villages in the same period while three compare the same village at diﬀerent periods. The results
showed statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in four village studies (2, 4, 5, 6). In only one village
study (2), however, were the results consistent with the original hypotheses.
In Dhoneshor, irrigation was associated with higher downward mobility among small
landowners. However, the evidence that irrigation caused downward mobility is not conclusive.
First, the period before 1960 saw higher downward mobility among small owners than in
1960–1971. This is attributed to ‘higher land productivity after introduction of HYVs’
Table 5. The Green Revolution and household mobility in Bangladesh
Village
Area
irrigated
(%) Period(s)
Treatment/
control
Land
owned
Change in land
owned
PcDown Up Stable
1 Gopinathpur (T)a 75 1951–1981 T Small 43 8 19 0.171
Hatshahar (C)b 17 1951–1981 C Small 17 15 1
T Medium 19 2 5 0.547
C Medium 17 1 5
T Large 17 0 5 0.588
C Large 12 0 3
2 Dhoneshor (T) 17 1971–1978 T Small 8 5 18 0.002
Dhoneshor (C) Na. 1960–1961 C Small 23 0 15
T Medium 8 5 17 0.415
C Medium 16 6 10
T Large 0 0 20 0.394
C Large 1 0 12
3 Goborgari (T) 67 1970–1977 T Small 4 7 12 0.150
Goborgari (C) 0 1960–1970 C Small 9 4 13
T Medium 9 1 4 0.621
C Medium 15 3 12
T Large 7 0 4 0.115
C Large 2 0 6
4 Nakugaon (T) 57 ?–1981 T Small 16 25 23 0.069
Aschipachkania (C) 1 ?–1981 C Small 5 12 22
T Medium 10 2 3 0.563
C Medium 2 3 12
T Large 6 0 3 0.029
C Large 2 0 10
5 Boringram (T) 80 1975–1995 T Small 84 10 18 0.099
Boringram (C) 0 ?–1975 C Small 36 7 12
T Medium 39 0 2 0.000
C Medium 7 6 1
T Large 7 0 3 0.566
C Large 2 1 2
6 Parbalach (T) High 1972–1986 T Small 12 10 53 0.067
Hasanpur (C) Na. 1972–1986 C Small 24 12 58
T Medium 4 8 6 0.448
C Medium 3 13 12
T Large 0 0 8
Not
computed
C Large 0 0 6
Notes: a¼Treatment. b¼Control. c¼Probability of a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between groups by Chi-square
test where fewer than 20 per cent of cells had expected frequency of less than 5, otherwise Fisher’s exact test.
Values reported are for 1-tail test.
Sources: 1. Rahman (1986); 2. 3. Van Schendel (1981a); 4. Islam (1985); 5. Westergaard (1980); Westergaard
and Hossain (2005); 6. Ullah (1996).
1574 A. Orr
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [I
nd
ian
 Sc
ho
ol 
of
 B
us
ine
ss]
 at
 04
:11
 14
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
13
 
(van Schendel, 1981a: 254). It is unclear why the Green Revolution should reduce downward
mobility in 1960–1971 and increase it in 1971–1978. Higher downward mobility in the second
period may have been due to the 1974 famine. Second, Dhoneshor may not be a fair test of the
new rice technology since the DTW was poorly managed and the area under irrigated rice was
small (17%).12 Third, the household classiﬁcation is based on income, so household mobility
may not reﬂect changes in ownership of land. Van Schendel (1981b: 30) notes that ‘the surpluses
of the 1960s and 1970s enabled most well-oﬀ households to start lucrative businesses or take
well-paying jobs’. This suggests that income from irrigated rice was invested in non-farm
activities rather than in buying land from small farmers.
The defects in historical models prompted critics to develop alternatives. One was the ‘semi-
feudal’ model whereby big farmers lacked the incentive to become capitalist farmers because they
found money-lending or renting land to sharecroppers more proﬁtable (Bhaduri, 1973).13 Thus,
the agrarian structure acted as a ‘built-in depressor’ that explained the slow progress of the
Green Revolution (Thorner, 1976). A second model argued that although small farmers retained
their land, eﬀective control passed to providers of new services like irrigation, tillage, and pest
management (Wood, 1999). Space does not allow us to review the evidence for these models here.
Suﬃce to say that, by 2000, villages once described as semi-feudal had embraced the new
technology (Westergaard, 1980; Westergaard and Hossain, 2005; Harriss, 1992). Similarly, the
growth of small-farmer irrigation groups and competitive service-providers kept control in the
hands of the family farm (Glaser, 1989; Lewis, 1991).
Why were such models so inﬂuential? External factors were probably decisive. The Green
Revolution was a child of American foreign policy.14 The establishment of IRRI in 1962 was
designed to prove that hunger in Asia could be solved by technology rather than by revolution
(Anderson, 1991). In Bangladesh, the 1971 Liberation War led to a radicalisation of politics
(Maniruzzaman, 1988). The Constitution envisaged a society ‘free from the exploitation of man
by man’. In reality, the new state was an ‘intermediate regime’ for which socialism meant
personal enrichment (Bertocci, 1982). As disillusionment with reform set in, militants split to
form a revolutionary socialist party while others went underground, roaming the countryside
killing rich peasants and moneylenders. Thus, the Green Revolution in Bangladesh coincided
with hopes for land reform or for a social revolution and state ownership of land. Many social
scientists in Bangladesh judged the Green Revolution in terms of these wider ideological
objectives.
The evidence from village studies supported the need for radical solutions. They portrayed the
village as ‘a sordid world of ruthless exploitation, violence and inhumanity’ (Siddiqui, 1985: 141),
a ‘jungle’ (van Beurden, 2007: 17), and the extended family as ‘a fac¸ade’ concealing ‘a bitter
struggle for survival’ (Wood, 1978: 116). First-hand experience of rural poverty had a traumatic
eﬀect on the authors of our sample village studies, the majority of them from the aﬄuent West.15
Most village studies were made in the 1970s, a decade marked by falling real wages, famine,
ﬂoods, and military coups (Figure 1), which encouraged some to believe that only social
revolution could prevent future famines (van Schendel, 1981a: 298).
An internalist explanation would emphasise a diﬀerent set of factors. A striking feature of the
debate over the Green Revolution was the use of historical models. Lenin’s model, based on his
analysis of nineteenth century Russia, saw capitalist agriculture as the outcome of a process of
diﬀerentiation in which rich peasants were transformed into a class of capitalist farmers (Lenin,
1964). This model was widely applied to the Green Revolution in India (Byres, 1972, 1982;
Pearse, 1980) and in Bangladesh (Rahman, 1986).
The classical Marxist model, although not directly applicable to the Green Revolution, was
inﬂuential in other ways. Based on his analysis of the English agricultural revolution, Marx saw
capitalist agriculture as led by landlords who enclosed common ﬁelds, expanded their holdings,
and cultivated through tenant farmers employing landless labourers (Marx, 1962). In Britain, the
impact of this model was far-reaching. Agrarian history was re-written by R. H. Tawney and the
Hammonds to understand the historical roots of poverty and to justify welfare reforms. The
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Enclosure Acts were seen as ‘the archetypal act of capitalist expropriation . . . and the central
national tragedy’ (Samuel, 1980: 38).16 This ‘catastrophic’ version of British history reached
across the political spectrum (Collini, 2004), providing an historical identity for the Labour
movement (Samuel, 1980) and justifying the anti-industrialism that rationalised Britain’s
economic decline (Weiner, 1985). This interpretation was challenged in the 1960s by revisionist
historians (Collins, 1967; Kerridge, 1969). Nevertheless, the orthodox view of the English
agricultural revolution was that, for the rural majority, the experience was one of material and
cultural impoverishment. This view was also reﬂected in the critique of the Green Revolution.17
A historical perspective on the Green Revolution was promoted by the Peasants Seminar at
the University of London and its journal Peasant Studies. For 17 years (1972–1989), the Peasants
Seminar provided a stable institutional platform for the debate on the Green Revolution.18 The
founders aligned its work squarely with that of British Marxist historians. The understanding of
the Green Revolution lay through history, ‘seeking the historical roots’ of the agrarian transition
(Byres, 2001: 348). The Seminar provided social scientists with a conceptual framework – the
transition from feudalism to capitalism – and with historical models for their PhD theses
(Rahman, 1986). This fusion of history and Marxism ‘was the kind of social science taken up
by critics of the ‘‘green revolution’’’ (Harriss, 2005: 28). They saw the new rice technology as
accelerating a broader process of agrarian change, whose consequences were best understood
through the use of models based on historical experience.
IV. Facts, Evidence, Beliefs
In Akira Kurosawa’s ﬁlm Rashomon four characters give diﬀerent versions of the same event.
The Rashomon Eﬀect has become a metaphor to explain controversies in social science (Heider,
1988). This section explores three ways in which the Rashomon Eﬀect inﬂuenced the controversy
over the Green Revolution in Bangladesh.
Facts
. . . the toughest thing to establish for the Indian countryside is a simple fact.
(Thorner, 1976: 4)
For almost a quarter-century, the facts about the Green Revolution in Bangladesh came from
village studies. This was part of a wider trend. The Village Studies Programme, launched by the
Institute of Development Studies in 1970 and championed by Michael Lipton, was an ambitious
‘attempt to construct a new, multidisciplinary theory of development, based on systematic
comparison of micro-studies’ (Harriss, 2005: 22). Bangladesh had its own Village Studies Group
(Adnan et al., nd). Villages became social science laboratories. Knowledge required personal
observation. Critics of the Green Revolution built reputations by making ‘ﬁeld trips’ to see with
their own eyes (Thorner, 1980; Walinsky, 1977).
The vogue for village studies reﬂected widespread distrust of oﬃcial statistics. Epitomised by
national surveys in India, their ﬂaws were mercilessly exposed by the Thorners (Thorner and
Thorner, 1962). Anthropologists revealed the problem of deﬁning concepts like farm size, debt,
occupation, and wages (Hill, 1984; Harriss, 1989). Wolf Ladejinsky ‘avoided local oﬃcials and
spent no time collecting oﬃcial statistics’ (Walinsky, 1977: 432). Often, however, oﬃcial
statistics were all that was available. Economists left ﬁeldwork to anthropologists (Srinivas,
1978) and mocked village studies as ‘cowdung economics’ (Parthasarthy, 1978). How else,
then, were social scientists to determine the ‘facts’ if not through immersion in ﬁeldwork and
village studies?
Critics of the Green Revolution have been accused of ‘guilt by association’ or blaming the new
technology for consequences caused by other factors like population growth (Rigg, 1989).
In practice, village studies carefully distinguished between diﬀerent causes. In Katni, for
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example, ‘The main reason for the shift to hired labour is not that yields are going up, but rather
that wages are going down’ (Hartmann and Boyce, 1988: 197–198). To avoid guilt by
association, many village studies used the method of treatment and control. Sadly, this method
was no guarantee that critics would get it right. Rahman (1986: 257) concluded that ‘the gains of
rapid expansion of productive forces have been expropriated by the rich peasantry, leaving the
other half into utter ruin’. However, his results showed no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the
treatment and control villages (Table 5, village 1). Reluctance to make greater use of treatment
and control often reﬂected time and budget constraints. Eight of the 10 village studies in our
sample were PhD theses (Table 1). Shortage of time often determined the choice of where to
work (Lewis, 1991) and of research tools (Howes, 1981). Others rejected treatment and control
on theoretical grounds, arguing that it cast farmers as passive recipients of the ‘impact’ of new
technology (Lewis, 1991; McGregor, 1991).
As we have seen, village studies gave an accurate picture of small farmer adoption.19 But their
real value was to illuminate social processes not general trends. Recognition grew that they were
an inadequate method for understanding the Green Revolution. Sobhan (1980: 122) lamented
the ‘indiscriminate generalisations based on micro-level village studies’ and urged the need for
‘pooling together the proliferating micro-studies of villages in Bangladesh to see whether enough
diversity of experience is at hand to permit more durable generalisations’. Arguments over the
relative merits of village studies and surveys grew in intensity. Conversations Between Economists
and Anthropologists (dedicated to Daniel Thorner, that scourge of the oﬃcial survey) explored
ways to combine the two methods (Bardhan, 1989).
The fundamental problem with village studies was their inability to say whether the picture
they gave was typical. Village studies produced multiple realities, reﬂected in the ﬁctional names
researchers gave to their villages, each emphasising what they perceived as important. Village
studies bred scepticism about generalisations. ‘In India, nothing is typical’ (Farmer, 1979: 310).
Village studies could not generate generalisations, only question the quality of the evidence on
which generalisations were based (Harriss, 1989). Thus, village studies could neither prove nor
disprove alternative theories of the Green Revolution.20 This problem was only resolved by the
introduction of carefully-designed, nationwide surveys. Ultimately, the choice of methods
came down to resources. The switch from village studies to national surveys was led by the
international agricultural research centres with their expanding budgets and network of research
partners.21
Evidence
Historians distinguish between facts and evidence, where facts are selected to test a model
(Evans, 1997). The facts amassed by village studies provided meagre evidence for Lenin’s model
of polarisation. What features of this model proved so misleading?
Critics of the Green Revolution saw the distribution of beneﬁts as predetermined by the
agrarian structure. Attempts to circumvent this structure through cooperatives were ‘futile’
(Khan, 1979: 414), and their failure was ‘inevitable’ (Blair, 1978: 77). Similarly, the agrarian
structure determined technology adoption. In the semi-feudal model, big farmers preferred to
extract the surplus through money-lending and trade (Hartmann and Boyce, 1988). Historians
invoked the agrarian structure to trace the roots of agricultural stagnation into the distant past –
a sort of Whig history in reverse (Bose, 1986). Only through land reform would small farmers
share the beneﬁts of the Green Revolution (Januzzi and Peach, 1980). Technology played a
subordinate role. The Green Revolution was not the parent of capitalist agriculture but merely
the ‘midwife’, assisting at the birth (Byres, 1972). Adoption of new technology was determined
by the demand from big farmers.
Both the Leninist and semi-feudal models overlooked evidence that policy and technology
could evolve to overcome constraints imposed by the agrarian structure. Bangladesh was an
‘intermediate’ regime heavily reliant on foreign aid. Policies did not automatically favour big
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farmers. The state resisted demands for tractorisation, which critics argued would hasten
polarisation (Gill, 1983; Lewis, 1991). Again, the state imposed restrictions on the import of
engines for Shallow Tubewells (STWs). When these were lifted in 1987, the result was an
inﬂux of cheap Chinese engines that eﬀectively killed the ‘built-in depressor’. By 2000, one in
six farmers owned an STW (Hossain, 2009). Similarly, aid donors inﬂuenced the priorities for
rice research. The establishment in 1971 of the Consultative Group for International
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) made IRRI accountable to donor agencies that prioritised
equity and poverty. The result was a new focus on rainfed rice environments and resource-
poor farmers. Critics rightly saw this as ‘an attempt to resist rural proletarianization’ (Oasa,
1987: 24).
Critics saw the Green Revolution as part of an ‘agrarian transition’. The idea of ‘transition’
was potentially misleading. Transition implied that the destination was known in advance, but
the deﬁnition of the capitalist mode of production was the subject of lengthy debate. Again, the
development of capitalist agriculture was a long process ‘stretching over centuries’ (Byres, 1977:
259). Detecting the same trends over a very short period was diﬃcult if not impossible.
Transition also implied the co-existence of old and new. Pockets of genuine capitalist agriculture
might exist near Dhaka (Jahangir, 1979), but experienced observers saw no evidence of
capitalism even in Comilla district, where the Green Revolution began (Thorner, 1976). The
critics recognised these diﬃculties and stressed the need to test the model through careful
empirical research (Byres, 1982). What was insuﬃciently recognised, however, was the variety of
forms that the agrarian transition could take. Marx’s model was based on the speciﬁc historical
experience of eighteenth century England. But in other countries and even in other parts of
Britain the transition to capitalist agriculture took very diﬀerent forms. As they themselves
admitted, the critics were slow to recognise the diversity of historical experience and the
limitations of a universal model (Byres, 1991).
One reason Lenin’s model proved so durable was its apparent relevance for the wheat
growing areas of north-west India. There, experience seemed to follow Lenin’s model,
including the emergence of a new class of capitalist farmers (Thorner, 1980), class polarisation,
eviction of tenants, and mechanisation (Walinsky, 1977). This was where the Green Revolution
was ﬁrst introduced. Simple path-dependence meant that it became the template for
understanding the Green Revolution in rice-growing regions.22 In Bangladesh, the critics tried
to replace the ‘Punjab model’ of agrarian change (Wood, 1994: 164) with one more relevant for
Bangladesh. Wood’s (1978) ‘minifundist’ model was an original attempt for a speciﬁc region,
based on ﬁeld observation. But it remained wedded to the view that land was passing from
small to big farmers. Only when the critics abandoned the concept of ‘de-peasantisation’ did
they begin to produce plausible alternative models (Wood, 1999; Harriss, 2006; Bhaduri et al.,
1986).
Beliefs
The critics of the Green Revolution focused on the distribution of beneﬁts. Their concern was
whether the Green Revolution had made income more unequal. By contrast, what mattered to
IRRI’s economists was access to the new technology. These contrasting views also reﬂected
disagreement over the causes of poverty. The critics saw poverty as the result of inequality. If the
Green Revolution made income more unequal, poverty would also increase. The defenders of the
Green Revolution saw poverty as the result of low productivity. If the Green Revolution raised
rice yields, it would simultaneously reduce poverty.
This disagreement reﬂected opposing beliefs. For some critics, the focus on inequality
reﬂected personal experience of apartheid or of racism in the American South (van Schendel,
1985; Briscoe, 2001). Researchers had preconceived ideas: ‘I expected to be investigating
new forms of exploitation which further enriched the wealthy and impoverished the poor’
(Glaser, 1989: 51). These ideas were ‘sometimes more convictions than clear understandings’
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(van Beurden, 2007: 41). Changing one’s mind was ‘diﬃcult because of my initial conviction
about the validity of the ‘‘Marxist’’ thesis’ (Khan, 1989: xi). According to Thorner (1976: 2) the
semi-feudal model was ‘a conviction still so ﬁrmly held that no data, analysis, or argument can
shake it’. Similarly, the focus on access to new technology by the defenders of the Green
Revolution reﬂected their academic training. Social science at IRRI was dominated by
agricultural economics, which believed that traditional agriculture was poor because it lacked
access to proﬁtable technology (Schultz, 1968). This reﬂected the conviction that science could
provide practical solutions to complex political problems (Anderson, 1991). The Green
Revolution seemed to vindicate this belief. The ﬁrst MV, IR8, became a visible symbol of
modernity, promising developing nations a new world of abundance (Cullather, 2004).
On many occasions, therefore, the protagonists were talking past each other. IRRI defended
the Green Revolution by showing that the new technology had also been adopted by small
farmers. But as the critics pointed out,
Saying that their data ‘do not support the hypothesis that small farmers have generally
lagged behind largely in the use of new technology that would increase their yields, income,
and employment’ is not the same as saying that the small farmers have not lagged behind in
yields, income, and employment. Their answer does not go to the core of the issue. (Feder,
1983: 22)
Similarly, the problem of whether the Green Revolution increased income inequality could not
be resolved by evidence on relative yields from new technology:
. . . a comparison of yields per hectare on large and small farms is not enough to address
the question . . . whether or not large farms are gaining an economic advantage. This is
but one small example where a broad question, such as income per hectare, was ‘reduced’
to some related but narrower question, such as yield per hectare. (Anderson et al., 1991:
95, 98)
IRRI’s economists interpreted equity as equal access to new technology (Barker and Herdt,
1978). Only later did they seriously address the same question as the critics. This reﬂected
pressure from the CGIAR, where IRRI’s donors echoed the critics and demanded that research
address issues of equity and the problems of resource-poor farmers (Oasa, 1987). Consequently,
the defence of the Green Revolution shifted from technology adoption to the direct eﬀects on
income distribution and poverty, both for farmers and the landless (Hossain, 1989; David and
Otsuka, 1994). For the critics this was a Pyrrhic victory since the evidence showed the Green
Revolution had not increased income inequality.
From a present perspective, a striking feature of the debate is the lack of interest in what
villagers themselves thought about the Green Revolution. Social reportage came from villages
untouched by the new rice technology (Arens and van Beurden, 1977; Hartmann and Boyce,
1988). Arguably, what mattered for the majority of Bangladeshis was not the impact of the
Green Revolution on inequality or productivity but its impact on poverty. In the words of
one landless labourer, ‘Without the Boro we would all have died!’ (Glaser, 1989: 159). But the
question never came up, because poverty did not yet dominate the research agenda. Reﬂecting on
his experience in Bangladesh, one IRRI scientist wrote:
As I reﬂect I am puzzled on the one hand by the vehemence of some of the critics of Green
Revolution technology and on the other hand that a marginal farm family like Kalam’s
wants the same technology. Obviously Kalam does not see a social determinism in which his
family will become dispossessed because of the Green Revolution technology. He perceives
it as an opportunity. It leads me to conclude that there must be something missing in our
understanding of technology and its impact. Does Kalam see the Green Revolution
Why were So Many Wrong about the Green Revolution? 1579
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [I
nd
ian
 Sc
ho
ol 
of
 B
us
ine
ss]
 at
 04
:11
 14
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
13
 
technology as more than mechanical and biochemical inputs? Does he see a shift in status in
which his family has access to credit, fertiliser, pump repairs and so on, and with that shift
greater security? I do not know because I never thought to explore what a marginal farm
family perceived its gain to be from embracing the irrigated Green Revolution technology.
(Magor, 1996: 217–218)
This recalls the psychology experiment where, told to count how many times people pass a
basketball, the subjects concentrate so hard that they fail to notice a prancing gorilla (Simons
and Chablis, 1999).23 A similar ‘inattentional blindness’ aﬀected many social scientists, on both
sides of the debate.
V. Conclusion
Why were so many social scientists wrong about the Green Revolution? In the case of
Bangladesh the answer lies in a combination of errors, at several levels.
Village studies were no substitute for generalisations based on nationally-representative
sample surveys. They fuelled the controversy without being able to resolve it. In this sense, they
were a mistaken method. Critics also misunderstood the technology itself. The slow progress of
the Green Revolution reﬂected the technical challenge of developing MVs for rainfed rice
environments rather than socio-economic constraints. The critique of the Green Revolution was
based on a misleading model of the agrarian transition that required de-peasantisation and
the transfer of land from small to big farmers. In Britain, the critics of the Green Revolution
inherited a historical narrative central to a wider critique of ‘industrialism’ that equated the
agrarian transition with impoverishment. In Bangladesh, Lenin’s model became a political
weapon in an ideological struggle to complete the ‘unﬁnished revolution’. The dominance of this
model in Bangladesh is explained as much by the cultural and political context as by its relevance
for understanding the Green Revolution.
Disagreement over facts, evidence, and beliefs created a Rashomon Eﬀect. Village studies
produced facts that could neither prove nor disprove claims about what was happening at the
national level. Critics of the Green Revolution emphasised the determining role of the agrarian
structure in technology adoption and the distribution of beneﬁts, but overlooked evidence on
how policy and technology could change to overcome these constraints. Finally, there were
diﬀerences in convictions between the protagonists. Social scientists disagreed over whether to
evaluate the Green Revolution by its impact on inequality or on productivity. For all these
reasons, the controversy was hard to resolve.
These themes still echo in the contemporary literature on rural development. In Africa, village
studies have exposed the weakness of oﬃcial statistics (Wiggins, 2000). In Asia, re-studies of
villages ﬁrst studied during the Green Revolution now focus on understanding development
processes (Rao and Charyulu, 2007). Social scientists continue to rely on historical models. The
Green Revolution has itself become a historical model for understanding the Gene Revolution in
transgenic crops (Lipton, 2007). Again, some have questioned the relevance of the ‘Asian model’
of the Green Revolution for Africa, while others see universal principles (Otsuka and Kalirajan,
2005). Finally, beliefs remain inﬂuential. There is a shared focus on poverty. But debates over
the role of the market and the state in eliminating poverty reﬂect ideological convictions.
Similarly, the debate over transgenic crops reﬂects conﬂicting beliefs about science (Herring,
2007). Pandora’s Box remains as divisive a symbol for social scientists today as it was during the
Green Revolution.
What are the lessons of this debate for the research process? They can be summarised as
follows: A balance between micro-research and carefully-designed national surveys; a clear
understanding of what new technology can and cannot do; greater awareness of the internal and
external factors that inﬂuence the choice of research models and methods; a suspicion of
universal models; above all, the willingness to challenge one’s own convictions.
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Notes
1. Initially, IRRI’s economists believed the critics. ‘My speciﬁc objective [in joining IRRI in 1973] was to try to
understand why small farmers weren’t using the new semi-dwarf rice . . . Because that’s what all the journal articles
were talking about . . . and we went to central Luzon . . . and went there to see, why aren’t these small farmers using
this miracle rice? Well, it turned out that they were . . . ! Well, why does everybody have it wrong? So that became
a theme of inquiry.’ (Herdt, 2009).
2. This paragraph is based on the results of the Global II Project on the social and economic implications of large-scale
introduction of new varieties of foodgrains, conducted by the United Nations Research Institute for Social
Development (UNRISD) which conducted research in 15 developing countries between 1970 and 1974. A summary
of results appeared in 1974 (UNRISD, 1974) and a synthesis in 1980 (Pearse, 1980). Griﬃn’s Political Economy of
Agrarian Change (1979), which became the most widely read critique of the Green Revolution, was an outcome of this
Project.
3. For area planted, sharecropping, and changes in farm size see Hossain et al. (2002): 373–377; for mechanisation, see
GoB (1999b: Table 01); for income distribution and poverty, see Mujeri and Sen (2006: Tables A2.10, A2.11).
4. For an analysis of why the predictions were wrong, see Osmani (1998).
5. Our deﬁnition includes both anthropological village studies based on participant observation and ‘studies at the
village level’ on the adoption of new rice varieties. Only four of the 10 village studies in Table 1 are classed as village
studies by Adnan (1990).
6. A ﬁfth village study reached similar conclusions on adoption but the data are not comparable with those from our
other sample studies (Jones, 1984).
7. One study of two villages in diﬀerent districts showed that, to begin with, small farmers were slower than big farmers
to adopt new rice varieties, but eventually caught up. In one village this took two years, but in the other it took more
than 15 years (Alauddin and Tisdell, 1991).
8. These refer to the 19 old districts before independence in 1971 (Adnan, 1990).
9. The survey was commissioned by the Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation (BADC) in response to
criticisms of the Deep Tubewell Project in north-west Bangladesh by ‘anthropological studies’, a veiled reference to
Hartmann and Boyce (1979).
10. Bangladesh has three overlapping rice seasons. Aus rice is direct-seeded or transplanted between April/May and
harvested in July/August before the monsoon. T. Aman rice is transplanted in July/August and harvested in
November/December, while B. Aman is direct-seeded on lower-lying land in March/April before the seasonal ﬂoods
and harvested in November/December after the ﬂoods have receded. Boro is grown with irrigation in the dry season,
and transplanted in January/February and harvested in April/May.
11. This paragraph is based on Blair (1978); Wood (1978); Jones (1982); de Vylder (1982); and Khan (1989).
12. Another critique was based on a village with only 10 per cent of land under irrigation (Wood, 1978: 104).
13. Of the 14 sample studies in Table 1, seven cited Bhaduri (1973), while 10 cited Griﬃn (1979).
14. The ﬁrst public use of the term ‘Green Revolution’ was in a speech on 8 March 1968 in Washington, DC by William
S. Gaud, the administrator for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Chandler, 1982:
117). The implicit comparison was with the Red Revolution that threatened south-east Asia.
15. ‘My stay in Fatehpur was a profound and radicalising experience . . . what I saw and learned changed the course of
my life’ (Briscoe, 2001: 3823). ‘We ourselves went through a process of radicalisation’ (Arens and van Beurden, 1977:
1). Revolutionary enthusiasm was also ‘driven by moral reactions to the experience of the 1974–5 ﬂoods and famine’
(Wood, 1994: 557).
16. The mythic quality of this history is illustrated by R.H. Tawney who characterised himself as ‘a peasant displaced
from the soil’ (Turriﬀ, 1973: 71).
17. Thus, optimistic views of the Green Revolution were condemned as unhistorical (‘In other societies at other times
such changes have been accompanied by stress and disadvantaged groups’ (Byres, 1972: 101–102)), while others
emphasised the importance of ‘‘‘the lessons of history’’ for what rapid agricultural change does to poor people’
(Lipton with Longhurst, 1989: 23).
18. Participants in the Peasants Seminar who presented papers on Bangladesh included Geoﬀrey Wood (twice), Kamal
Siddiqui, Atiur Rahman, James Boyce, and Ben Crow (Byres, 2001: Appendix B).
19. For a rare counter-example, see Abdullah (1989).
20. By contrast, Casley and Lury (1981: 70) state that ‘One may not be able to generalise from it [a case study] but one
may be able to reject existing generalisations’. This seems to confuse generalisations and laws. A law (for example,
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‘the history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles’) can be falsiﬁed by a single case study
because it admits no exceptions. A generalisation, however, refers to the majority of cases, which implies the existence
of exceptions. See Evans (1997: 58–59).
21. IRRI’s budget quadrupled in real terms between 1972 and 1980, averaging $50 million per year throughout the 1980s
(Barker, 2010: 35).
22. The terms of the debate on the Green Revolution were largely set by the Global II project. The Cambridge Project on
Agrarian Change was designed to test the Global II ﬁndings for rice-growing areas in south India and Sri Lanka
(Harriss-White and Harriss, 2007).
23. For the video, see http://viscog.beckman.illinois.edu/ﬂashmovie/15.php.
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